Research

WORKING PAPERS

Mandatory retirement policy for independent directors: Implications for the CEO (Job Market Paper) 

Abstract: Using Guo, Liu, and Nari Abyaneh’s (2025) novel dataset on mandatory retirement policies for independent directors, we investigate the effect of that policy on the main functions of the board of directors. Results show that firms that impose mandatory retirement policies (1) fire CEOs at a higher rate and have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and (2) pay higher wages to CEOs and are associated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Additionally, in terms of dealing with CEOs with specific characteristics, generalist and overconfident CEOs, these firms are more (less) likely to hire generalist (overconfident) CEOs, leading to higher firm value. Overall, the results are compatible with the idea that the mandatory retirement policy is associated with higher quality monitoring and enhanced CEO ability learning by the board of directors. 

Conferences: Southern Finance Association Conference (2025) (scheduled), Global Finance Association Conference

The Role of Mandatory Director Retirement Policies in Corporate Governance (with Feng (Jason) Guo and Tingting Liu) (under review at the Journal of Finance)

Abstract: We construct a novel dataset on mandatory retirement policies for independent directors at U.S. public firms from 1994 to 2020 using machine learning and manual verification. Adoption has increased over time, particularly among S&P 1500 firms, and firms generally enforce these policies. Firms with greater monitoring needs are more likely to adopt such policies, while those with greater advising needs are less likely. Adoption is associated with higher firm value when monitoring benefits dominate, but lower value when advising benefits are more important. These results highlight the importance of aligning board governance mechanisms with firm-specific oversight and advisory requirements.

Conferences: American Finance Association Conference (2026) (scheduled), European Finance Association Conference (2025) (scheduled), Midwest Finance Association  Conference (2025), Eastern Finance Association Conference (2025), Financial Management Association Conference (2025) (scheduled), Southern Finance Association Conference (2025) (scheduled), Silicon Prairie Finance Conference (2025), Southwestern Finance Association Conference (2025)

Classified boards, Temporal Faultlines, and Corporate Risk-Taking (with Ginka Borisova)

Abstract: Classified boards (CBs) protect directors from expedited replacement via multi-year terms, with elections for separate director classes staggered over time. How might the unique characteristics of CBs affect the way directors guide a firm’s strategic decision-making? We propose that staggered director groups will have different strategic horizons, generating temporal-based faultlines that can lead to board deadlock. We compare firms with CBs to those with unitary boards and find CBs exhibit outcomes associated with faultlines: lower firm performance, less frequent dismissal of underperforming CEOs, and less efficient CEO compensation. These faultlines serve as a channel for the lower corporate risk-taking we find in CB firms, preventing boards from reaching the consensus needed to undertake risky projects. We also link the decrease in risk-taking to board structure using an exogenous shock from legally imposed CBs.

Conferences: Southwestern Finance Association Conference (2023), Vietnam Symposium in Banking and Finance (2023), Vietnam Symposium in Entrepreneurship, Finance, and Innovation (2023)